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 "This is a story about four people: Everybody, Somebody, Anybody 
and Nobody. There was an important job to be done and Everybody 
was asked to do it. Everybody was sure Somebody would do it. 
Anybody could have done it, but Nobody did it. Somebody got angry 
about that because it was Everybody's job. Everybody thought 
Anybody could do it, but Nobody realized that Everybody wouldn't do 
it. It ended up that Everybody blamed Somebody when actually 
Nobody asked Anybody." 
N.N. 
1.        Global and universally occurring environmental problems 
The interest in global environmental problems has - in particular in the wake of 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992 -
increased substantially, in both the theoretical and the practical sense. This 
may be bound up with the growing pressure stemming from still unsolved 
problems, though it may also result from the insight that many of these 
problems cannot be solved even by the best national environmental policy on 
its own. 
In analyzing the problems and formulating policy, one has to distinguish 
between global and universally occurring environmental problems. The German 
Global Change Council (WBGU) bases its work on the following definition, 
placing it in the context of a network of global relations: "Global environmental 
problems are changes in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and on land the 
causes of which can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to human activities; 
these changes affect the natural metabolic cycles, the aquatic and terrestrial 
ecological systems, as well as economy and society; and they call for 
international agreements (cooperation) if they are to be dealt with effectively" 
(WBGU 1993; author's emphasis). 
The only environmental policy adequate to deal with the causes of global 
environmental problems is one with a global perspective. An example is the 
anthropogenic (intensified) greenhouse effect, which is destabilizing the global 
climate system and can be dealt with only through international cooperation, 
i.e. on the basis of binding international agreements, targets and measures. 
Environmental problems that occur universally may, on the other hand, be of a 
local or regional nature; they not necessarily require an approach of the kind 
just described. An example would be the increasing scarcity of freshwater, a 
problem that can be addressed locally and regionally, even though the 
strategy, in view of uneven problem-solving capacities, may need to be one 
coordinated at the international level. 
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Figure 1: Global network of interrelations 
Major trends in global environmental change 
 
Source: WBGU 1993, p. 189. 
4 The reason for the need for a global perspective and an internationalization 
of environmental policy is not only growing ecological-economic inter-
dependencies, the complexity of physical-chemical cause-and-effect relation-
ships, the long-term nature of the effects and the possible irreversibility of 
ecological damage, it is also and in particular to be sought in the multiplicity of 
political actors, their conflicting interests, the variability of their economic and 
technical capacities, and the social organization of technology and science. 
Global or universally occurring environmental problems call for policies that, 
while not releasing the nation state from its responsibility as the main actor, go 
beyond traditional national sovereignty. It is precisely this need that makes an 
ecologically effective, economically efficient, and socially acceptable solution 
an enormously difficult proposition. What is called for if free-rider behavior is to 
be warded off is international cooperation and global diplomacy that provide 
consensual targets, an adequate set of instruments, and the institutional 
conditions appropriate to a coordinated implementation of policy. A major 
problem facing international environmental policy is thus that its goals must be 
implemented by means of voluntary action and enforced by states whose 
territorial authority is limited - and that the mechanisms available to induce 
states to enforce international environmental policy are no more than partial 
ones. 
2.        Globalization of the way in which the problem is perceived. A 
survey 
Global or universally occurring environmental problems can be approached in 
entirely different ways. The literature often refers to the "environment formula" 
according to which global environmental impacts (I) are caused by world 
population growth (P), increasing affluence (consumption of goods and 
services (A), and environmentally unsound technology (T). 
I = f (P, A, T) 
This formula has, it is true, had little effect on the formulation of practical 
policy, even though it does take into account the demographic, economic, and 
technological forces driving the degradation and destruction of the global 
environment (such as the ozone layer, climate, biodiversity, soils, water, and 
oceans). What has happened instead is that a medial structure of international 
environmental policy has emerged which more or less markedly integrates 
these driving forces or the intermedial nexus. 
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The most important reason for this mode of policy formulation is a historical-
pragmatic one: real environmental problems develop at different paces, are 
perceived by the public, assessed by science, and addressed by the political 
sphere at different levels of intensity. This was the case as national 
environmental policy developed, with its policies geared far more to clean air 
and waste disposal than e.g. to soil protection - and it continues to be the case 
in international environmental policy, which is far more advanced in formulating 
ozone and climate policy than e.g. biodiversity policy and soils and water 
policy. 
2.1      Ozone policy 
The global environmental problem that has received the most intensive political 
attention is the degradation Of the stratospheric ozone layer. A total of ten 
years of negotiations led here to a dynamic international environmental regime 
based on a legal framework consisting of a stable, institutional component 
(Framework Convention) and a flexible, instrumental component (Protocol). 
The "Vienna Convention" of 1985 defined the problem, the "Montreal 
Protocol" of 1987 obliged the signatories to reduce the use of the 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halones that are destroying the ozone layer by 
50 percent (reference year: 1986) by the year 1999, though it did permit, for an 
initial phase, products to be transferred to other countries. The 1989 Helsinki 
Conference of the Parties initiated the planned revision of the agreement, and 
provided for a complete production ban on CFCs and a gradual reduction of the 
other ozone-depleting substances. The follow-up conferences held in London 
(1990) and Copenhagen (1992) decided on further reductions of the phase-out 
period. 
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Source: WBGU 1993, p. 23. 
Aside from these stepped-up reduction schedules, however, an expansion of 
international cooperation also appeared necessary in that it was initially only 
industrialized countries that had submitted to the rules, and not developing 
countries like Brazil, China, and India, which have potentially large domestic 
markets for cars, refrigerators, and air-conditioning systems that operate with 
conventional CFC technologies. To facilitate an accession of these countries to 
the Protocol, the signatories decided to develop a mechanism aimed at funding 
and providing access to modern technology. The 1990 London conference set 
up the Multilateral Ozone Fund which has the task of covering the increased 
costs (full incremental costs) incurred by developing countries in converting 
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Figure 2: Ozone depletion rates per decade 
Original Montreal Protocol and revisions  
their production to ozone-compatible substances and processes. By phasing 
out ozone-depleting substances in the industrialized countries and transferring 
funds and technology to developing countries (substitution) the ozone regime 
managed, in a relatively brief period of time, to take on the character of a model 
case of international environmental policy (for details, see Benedick 1998, and 
Biermann 1998). 
The conditions for the success of ozone policy were, however, highly 
specific, and cannot simply be applied to other problem cases: the relatively 
uncontroversial proof of the cause-and-effect nexus involved made the political 
significance of science transparent, the highly concentrated, oligopolistic 
structure involved in manufacturing CFCs weakened the industry's resistance 
to conversion of production, the risk of intensified UV radiation was perceived 
by the general public as posing an immediate threat. All these factors facilitated 
and accelerated the process of policy formulation and implementation. 
Still, the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer remains on the political 
agenda because the various replacement substances likewise pose ecological 
hazards, because there are implementation problems in the nonsignatory 
states, and because large-scale illegal imports are taking place (in particular 
from parts of the former Soviet Union to the USA). 
2.2     Climate policy 
The environmental problem most discussed at the moment is climate change. 
The climatically active trace gases - like carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), 
nitrogen oxides (N20), halogenated and perfluorated hydrocarbons (HFCs and 
PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) - are disrupting the earth's thermal 
balance by partially blocking thermal radiation into outer space (thus: 
intensified greenhouse effect). The largest share (more than 50 percent) of this 
warming process falls to CO2, which, practically ubiquitous, is a by-product of 
all economic activities and whose levels correlate highly with gross national 
product. The C02 problem is thus a North-South problem, in that per capita 
emissions differ substantially between industrialized and developing countries 
(see Figure 7 on this point). 
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Figure 3: Anticipated increase of C02 concentration, in ppmv 
 
Source: IPCC 1996, p. 23. 
The CH4 emissions (which account for some 18 percent of the greenhouse 
effect) on the other hand constitute a South-North problem inasmuch as large 
quantities of this greenhouse gas originate in agriculture, in rice cultivation, and 
in the digestion process of cattle herds in the countries of the South. Unlike the 
CFCs, it is difficult or even impossible to quickly reduce or indeed phase out 
carbon dioxide and methane emissions, The case may be different with HFC, 
PFC, and SF6 emissions, all of which stem from industrial processes for which 
substitutes can be found. 
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While the causes of the artificial warming of the earth's atmosphere are 
relatively well known, the uncertainty as to its effects continues to be 
substantial. The temperature increase of 2°C (medium IPCC scenario, 1996) 
anticipated as a global mean for the coming century would no doubt entail 
grave consequences. The winters in the moderate zones could be shorter and 
warmer, the summers longer and hotter. The ensuing climate change would 
exacerbate already existing regional problems like weather extremes, drought, 
or soil erosion and endanger sustainable development in large parts of the 
world. 
Further impacts of global warming would include the melting of ice (glaciers 
and pole caps) and the thermal expansion of the ocean waters engendered by 
it. According to the 1996 IPCC assessment, a temperature rise of 2°C (medium 
scenario) would raise the level of the oceans by roughly 50 centimeters - or 
indeed even further should large blocks of polar ice shear off into the sea. 
Since roughly one third of the world's population lives within a distance of 60 
kilometers from the coastline, these people's living and working conditions 
would be affected, some individual countries (like e.g. Bangladesh) and many 
island states (like e.g. the Maldives) would be threatened in their very 
existence. 
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Source: IPCC 1996, p. 384. 
The ''United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change" (in what 
follows: Climate Convention) adopted at the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio in 1992, which came into effect in March 1994, is, like 
the ozone regime, dynamic in its conception (annual conferences of the parties, 
obligation to report regularly, flanking scientific research, secretariat in Bonn) 
and contains a potentially powerful definition of the conditions of climate 
stabilization (Article 2). 
"The ultimate objective... is to achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level would be 
achieved within a time-frame sufficient 
•  to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, 
• to  ensure  that  food production is not threatened, and 
• to  enable  economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner." 
(Author's emphasis) 
At the Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto in 1997 the convention was 
supplemented by a protocol (the "Kyoto Protocol") containing modest yet 
concrete stipulations on targets and timetables, some initial measures 
designed to reduce emissions (sources) or to enhance nature's absorption 
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Figure 5: Sea level rise, 1990-2100, in cm 
Low, medium, and high projection  
capacity (sinks), as well as some institutional arrangements for implementing 
the convention. 
Figure 6: "Kyoto Protocol", Annex B 
 
Signatory party  Quantified emission 
limitation or reduction 
commitment 
(Percentage points refer 
to base year) 
Signatory party  Quantified emission 
limitation or reduction 
commitment 
(Percentage points refer 
to base year) 
Australia  108  Latvia  92 
Austria  92  Liechtenstein  92 
Belgium  92  Lithuania  92 
Bulgaria*  92  Luxembourg  92 
Canada  94  Monaco  92 
Croatia*  95  Netherlands  92 
Czech Republic*  92  New Zealand  100 
Denmark  92  Norway  101 
Estonia*  92  Poland*  94 
European Union  92  Portugal  92 
Finland  92  Romania*  92 
France  92  Russia  100 
Germany  92  Slovakia  92 
Greece  92  Slovenia  92 
Hungary*  94  Spain  92 
Iceland  110  Sweden  92 
Ireland  92  Switzerland  92 
Italy  92  Ukraine*  100 
Japan  94  United Kingdom  92 
    USA  93 
* Countries in transformation to a market economy 
Source: Kyoto Protocol, Annex. 
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The fields of economics and political science have developed several 
strategic proposals concerning the instruments of future climate policy. These 
extend from the imposition of national and global resource taxes or emission 
charges to joint implementation and internationally tradeable emission 
certificates (see Section 3 for a discussion of this issue). Adoption of these 
proposals would presuppose and entail drastic changes in the growth path and 
the structure of the industrialized countries and the developing countries alike 
(ecological structural change of the economy). 
Figure 7: C02 emissions in the industrial sector, 1992, in tons 
Ranking  Total emissionPer capita emission 
1  USA 4.881.349  19.13 
2 China,  PR  2.667.982  2.27 
3  CIS 2.103.132  14.11 
4 Japan  1.093.470  8.79 
5 Germany  868.136  10.96 
6 India  769.440  0.88 
7 Ukraine  611.342  11.72 
8  United Kingdom 566.246  9.78 
9 Canada  409.862  14.99 
 
10 Italy  407.701  7.03 
11 France  362.076  6.34 
12 Poland  341.892  8.90 
13 Mexico  332.852  3.77 
14 Kasachstan  297.892  17.48 
15 South  Africa  290.291  7.29 
World 22.339.408  4.10 
Source; WRI 1996, pp. 328f. 
A number of measures might be considered as means of practically 
implementing dynamic conceptions of emission reduction and/or absorption; 
they include above all the 
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•  reduction  of the consumption  of fossil fuels  by enhancing  energy 
efficiency  in the fields of transportation energy,  electricity,   heating 
energy; 
•  installation of new, efficient energy generation technologies such as 
combined  heat  and  power  plants  (CHP),   district  heating  and  air- 
conditioning, gas turbines; 
•  substitution of fossil fuels by renewable energies such as biomass, wind 
energy, photovoltaics, hydrogen; and the 
•  enlargement of C02  sinks,   in particular by putting  an end to the 
destruction   of  rain  forests  and  promoting   large-scale   reforestation 
programs. 
The impending implementation of climate policy thus involves all three 
central conflict-laden issues of an international policy of sustainable 
development: (1) the question as to the quantity and quality of further economic 
growth, (2) the question of the stabilization of the global ecosystem, and (3) the 
question of social and intergenerational justice. 
2.3     Biodiversity policy 
The "United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity" (in what follows: 
Biodiversity Convention), which was adopted by 154 states during the UN 
conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and came into effect in December 1993, 
brings to expression the insight of the international community that we are in 
need of a far-reaching, paradigmatic change as far as the conservation of 
nature is concerned. The concept of biological diversity - or biodiversity -
embraces all animal and plant species, including microorganisms, the genetic 
variability within the species, and the earth's ecosystems in which these 
species live together. 
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Plant species  26.106 
Source: UNEP 1995, p. 234. 
In spite of numerous agreements under international law on the protection 
and careful utilization of biological diversity, the destruction of natural habitats 
and the extinction of species associated with it continue unabated. The main 
reason no doubt is that the approaches to international protection of nature and 
species hitherto adopted do not go far enough; and the situation is exacerbated 
by the lack of political will and of financial commitments needed to address it. 
The Biodiversity Convention raises the claim to change this situation. 
This claim finds expression in the convention's preamble. It declares the 
protection of biological diversity to be a "common concern of humankind." 
Article 1 then states: 
"The objectives of this Convention ... are 
•  the conservation of biological diversity, 
•  the sustainable use of its components and 
•  the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization 
of genetic resources, including 
appropriate access to genetic resources, 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all 
rights over these resources and technologies, and 
appropriate funding." 
(Author's emphasis) 
These goals of the Biodiversity Convention constitute a "triad" which is also 
expected to be reflected in its implementation. Linking conservation issues with 
15 issues of economic and technological policy has thus produced a complex set 
of rules defining the general framework for future action. 
Aside from the articles governing the protection and sustainable utilization of 
biological diversity and the transfer of financial resources and technology 
(Articles 1-22), the second part of the convention (Articles 23-42) covers 
innovative institutional mechanisms concerning the cooperation process and 
the further development of the treaty itself. It provides for regular conferences 
of the parties at reasonable intervals at which the negotiations on individual 
areas of the convention are to be continued and the implementation of its terms 
verified. Prior to each conference of the parties, a subsidiary board on scientific 
and technological issues (the so-called SBTTA) has to work out 
recommendations to be voted on. A permanent secretariat has been set up in 
Montreal to supervise and administer the convention. 
Thanks to its dynamic conceptualization, the Biodiversity Convention is 
fundamentally capable of addressing new issues and pursuing contentious 
points on which no agreement had been reached when the accord was signed. 
One particularly important point here is - not unlike the case of the Climate 
Convention - the possibility of adopting implementation protocols geared to 
specifying targets, time-tables, and measures on individual issues. 
It was agreed at the Second Conference of the Parties in Jakarta in 1995 to 
initiate a dialogue with the three thematically related older conservation 
treaties, the Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Bonn Convention on the 
Protection of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), and the Convention on 
Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar). 
As far as further steps toward implementing the Biodiversity Convention are 
concerned, an international working group was appointed to negotiate a 
protocol on biological safety (Biosafety Protocol), the task of which is to set out 
rules for safely handing and for transporting genetically modified organisms. 
This protocol is set to be adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties in 
Bratislava in 1998. A panel of experts was set up on the biodiversity of the seas 
and coastal areas; it is expected to advance proposals on this specific complex 
of issues soon. 
The trade-related dimension of the Biodiversity Convention makes it 
necessary also to enter into a dialogue with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). This dialogue would address, among other things, the agreement on 
trade-related intellectual property rights (the so-called TRIPS). 
16 Figure 9: Deforestation in the tropics, 1980-1995 





1980-90  1990-95  1990-95 
(in %) 
Developing countries, total             1.871  -15.5  -13.7  -0.7 
Africa                                                  508  4.3  - 3.8  -0.7 
Latin America                                     942  -   6.8  - 5.8  -0.6 
Asia and Oceania                              421  -   4.4  - 4.2  -0.9 
Source: FAO 1997, pp. 18 and 182f. 
Another complex task facing biodiversity policy is the protection and 
management of the forests. The global dimensions of forest destruction call for 
swift, immediately effective protective measures. The present mode of forest 
management must be replaced by ecologically sustainable forms of utilization. 
In the industrialized countries the existing forests must be protected against any 
further degradation, and reforestation must be enhanced. In the developing 
countries the key task will be to bring forest protection into line with economic 
development. An important point here would be to create sources of income 
stemming from the sustainable utilization of forests. The Forest Declaration of 
1992, which is legally nonbinding, centers on such economic interests. 
Besides, the efforts continue to find an internationally binding arrangement 
for the protection of forests, either through the formulation of an independent 
Forest Convention, or by means of a Forest Protocol within the framework of 
the Biodiversity Convention. 
The negotiations on this subtopic of biological diversity are taking place in 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) which is expected to present its 
proposals for future institutional arrangements of an international forest policy 
in 1998. Since it is forests - in particular the remaining natural forests - that 
provide a habitat for most of the terrestrial animal and plant species, protection 
of overall biological diversity depends essentially on utilizing the forests in an 
ecologically sustainable manner. But since large-scale reforestation can also 
be used to mitigate the greenhouse problem, an active forest policy would be 
best climate policy. 
One weakness of the new biodiversity policy can be discerned in the low 
level of funding provided, measured in terms of the actual need for action. The 
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Global Environment Facility (GEF), the provisional funding mechanism of the 
Biodiversity Convention, is also, it should be noted, responsible for 
implementing projects aimed at protecting the ozone layer, climate, the oceans, 
and taking action against desertification. A grand total of 800 million US-$ was 
available to conserve biological diversity in the period between 1995 and 1997. 
In view of a funding requirement estimated by UNEP to be higher by a multiple 
factor, these commitments are testimony to a continuing lack of willingness on 
the part of the states to place the Biodiversity Convention on a secure financial 
footing of its own. 
2.4     Soil and water problems 
Aside from the quantitative loss of soils due to the sealing of land surfaces, the 
world is experiencing a tremendous qualitative deterioration of formerly 
productive soils. It is difficult, however, to determine whether this is a global 
environmental problem or (merely) one that occurs universally. 
Figure 10:     Causes of soil degradation, in million of hectares 
 
Source: UNEP/ISRIC 1991, p. 33. 
According to recent estimates the world's desert areas are expanding by 
roughly six million hectares per year. Up to two fifths of Africa's nondesert 
areas, as well as two thirds in Asia and one fifth in Latin America, could fall 
18 victim to desertification in the future. The growth of population, but also of cattle 
stocks, in these regions has impaired vegetation, thus accelerating soil erosion. 
Figure 11: Causes of desertification in northern China 
In percent of total area affected by desertification 
Group Number 
Human activities  94.5 
agricultural overutilization  25.4 
overgrazing 28.3 
removal of firewood  31.8 
nonadapted water use  8.3 
technical factors  0.7 
Natural causes 
advance of dunes  5.5 
Source: Zhu/Wang 1993, p. 1. 
Scientific research on these processes has shown that, compared with 
natural factors, economic, political, and social factors are far more important 
than was formerly assumed (see the example of China in Fig. 11). This is why 
what is called for is not only technical measures but also social and institutional 
innovations, and above all the introduction of appropriate land use rights. 
These issues are to be addressed by the "United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought, Particularly 
in Africa" (in what follows: Desertification Convention) that was convened on the 
initiative of African countries and signed in July 1994 (with its permanent 
secretariat in Bonn). 
This convention is not yet the legal foundation for a global soils policy, 
especially because the urgency of this problem is perceived quite differently in 
different quarters. It does, however, call for just as the Climate and 
Biodiversity Conventions do - international cooperation and is thus a potential 
predecessor of a global soils policy. 
The situation as regards a future global water policy is not quite so 
promising. The most recent UNEP report on this problematique indicates that 
1.2 billion people already lack sufficient and safe water; but water scarcity in 
19 the next decades threatens a total of roughly 80 states in which 40 percent of 
the World's population lives (UNEP 1996). In many cases water supply is 
reaching critical proportions due to drought, overutilization of water resources, 
and deforestation, while the demand for water continues to rise, owing to 
irrigation in agriculture, increasing urbanization and industrialization, and 
higher per capita water consumption associated with these developments. 
Figure 12: Water supply of selected countries in m
3 per capita, 1992 and 2010 
Countries as per region           1992                  2010  Changes in % 
Africa 
Egypt 30  20  -33 
Algeria 730  500  -32 
Kenya 560  330  -41 
Libya 160  100  -38 
Morocco 1.150  830  -28 
Mauritania 190  110  -42 
Niger 1.690  930  -45 
Rwanda 820  440  -46 
Somalia 1.390  830  -40 
Sudan 1.130  710  -37 
South Africa  1.200  760  -37 
Tunisia 450  330  -27 
Middle East 
Israel 330  250  -24 
Jordan 190  110  -42 
Lebanon 1.140  980  -30 
Saudi Arabia  140  70  -30 
Syria 550  300  -45 
Others 
Netherlands 660  600  -45 
Singapore 210  190  -9 
Hungary  580 570  -2 
Source: Own compilation of UN data. 
Water quality is also deteriorating in many parts of the world, in some cases 
dramatically. Surface water and groundwater are being polluted by nitrates and 
pesticides from agriculture, by leaks from municipal and industrial water and 
waste-water systems, from sewage treatment plants and refuse dumps. The 
critical standards for drinking water quality recommended by the World Health 
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Organization (WHO) are thus more and more often exceeded. The respective 
standards set by the EU Commission are not complied with by thousands of 
wells in Europe - which consequently should be closed down. 
Figure 13: Forms and causes of water pollution 
Form of pollution 
Pathogens  
Accumulation of nutrients 
Nitrate accumulation in 
groundwater 
Salinization of groundwater 











Emissions of air 
pollutants (sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen 
oxides 
Erosion 
Regions heavily affected 
Developing countries 
Industrial countries, countries 
in transformation, and some 
developing countries (e.g. 
Brazil, China; Mexico, 
Philippines) 
Europe, North America 
Arid zones of Africa, the 
Middle East, Asia, and 
Australia 
Europe, North America; 
regions in Asia and South 
America in the process of 
rapid industrialization 
China, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
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Pollution by heavy metals         Industrial waste water,   Industrial countries, countries 
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developing countries (e.g. 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama, 
Philippines) 
 
Source: German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 1995, 
pp. 29f. 
Water policy has a further international dimension in the sense that there are 
over 200 transnational river catchment areas in the world and a great number 
of lakes and other bodies of water with regional catchment areas for which 
viable agreements must be reached among the riparian states. 
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Beside the call for measures suited to securing, in qualitative and 
quantitative terms, the water supplies needed for a growing world population -
particularly developing new sources, establishing integrated water cycles, and 
preventing water pollution - in the future reducing water consumption will be of 
utmost importance not only in agriculture and industry but also in private 
households (demand-side management). The undesirable alternative would be 
further water rationing and water pollution - with all of the consequences this 
entails. There is thus an urgent need for political action on an efficient water 
price policy, a  redefinition of water utilization rights, and the transfer and 
installation of water-saving technologies. The initiative required should be 
developed through an internationally coordinated water strategy and could, in 
the not too distant future, lead up to the formulation of a global "Water 
Convention." 
2.5 The  waste  problem 
Many industrial products and chemical wastes are either nondegradable or 
difficult to store, and the transportation of hazardous wastes is regarded as 
difficult to control. Once it has crossed an international border, waste is subject 
to different, sometimes contradictory regulations. The export possibilities that 
continue to exist diminish the overly weak economic incentives to avoid 
generating waste at home; and this at the same time implies transferring part of 
the risk without transferring the technology needed to deal with it. 
In view of this problematique, the "Basle Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes" (1989) constituted a step in 
the right direction. But the problem lies in the practical implementation of this 
convention at the local and national level. It would in particular be important to 
come up with new technical and institutional arrangements to diminish the 
latent willingness to circumvent transportation controls and to ensure that 
waste materials continue to be treated in a manner free of risk for both man and 
the environment. 
Transboundary transportation of hazardous waste, and the treatment of such 
waste, will, it seems, continue to pose an unsolved problem for the future, one 
that calls for, and at the same time favors, an internationalization of policy. 
2.6  To sum up 
As the discussions in the previous sections have shown, internationalization 
has progressed differently in the various medial segments of environmental 
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policy -  the institutionalization of "global environmental policy" is as yet 
fragmentary (in detail Simonis 1996). While internationalization was from the 
very beginning immanent to ozone policy, it is also acknowledged in climate 
and biodiversity policy, though implementation continues to fall short of the 
mark. Soils and water policies are in an early phase of internationalization, 
while waste policy is and remains international in the sense and to the extent 
that local and national strategies devised to minimize hazardous wastes are 
ineffectual, i.e. the internationalization of the problem is not seen as a solution 
but as a way out. 
3.       Instruments of international environmental policy. The future 
In formulating the most recent international environmental conventions, three 
themes played a major role: efficiency, equity, and uncertainty. And as regards 
the implementation of such framework conventions by means of protocols, 
attention has, apart from legal provisions and sanctions, focused on three 
economic instruments: imposition of international taxes or charges, joint 
implementation, and internationally tradeable emission certificates. 
3.1     International emission taxes and charges 
The most important argument in favor of an international emission tax or charge 
is the reduction of pollutant emissions at the lowest possible costs. A tax or 
charge of this sort would induce rationally acting emitters with low marginal 
avoidance costs to reduce their emissions, while those with high marginal 
avoidance costs would find it more appropriate to pay the tax. Put in general 
terms: taxes and charges make use of the market mechanism to achieve an 
optimal adjustment to the given environmental problem, while direct 
governmental regulation can, in the individual case, be extremely expensive. 
(Tietenberg [1990] noted in a comparative study on the USA that the cost ratio 
of government regulation to environmental taxes in average is 4:1.) 
The most important argument that can be advanced against the imposition of 
an international tax is not economic but organizational: the tax volume needed 
to initiate an appreciable reduction of global emissions would be so huge (with 
reference to climate change, estimates ranging up to several hundred billion 
US-$) that a centralized administration of the funds would not be acceptable, 
while a decentral allocation of the funds would be very difficult to manage. 
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There is, however, also an ecological argument that can be advanced 
against any such international tax: in cases involving rapidly increasing 
marginal damage (like, for instance, the ozone hole or the loss of species) 
taxes or charges stand for an economic compromise that is no longer suitable 
to the ecological system in question. Here the only sensible solution is to set 
quantitative limits. 
While efficiency and equity are centra! criteria of the conventions on climate, 
biodiversity, and law of the seas, these agreements contain, surprisingly, no 
concrete statements on the introduction of an international tax or charge. The 
case is different with the two other instruments, which are either in place or in 
preparation. 
3.2      "Joint implementation" 
As regards the choice and formulation of the instruments of international 
environmental policy, the passages most relevant here are Article 3, Paragraph 
3 of the Climate Convention, which calls on the signatories to implement the 
relevant measures cost-effectively. This efficiency clause is of particular 
significance in view of the ecological and economic framework conditions of 
any international environmental policy: when dealing with emissions with global 
impacts (for instance: carbon dioxide emissions) it makes no difference 
whatever where in the world these emissions are reduced; if, however, their 
costs are to be minimized, we must face the fact of the marginal costs of 
emission reduction, which are highly variable internationally; i.e. we must 
observe the economic argument. It is against this background that the 
instrument of "joint implementation" found its way into the Climate Convention 
(in particular Article 4, Paragraph 2a, 2b). The First Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention in Berlin in 1995 (the "Berlin Mandate") decided on a trial 
pilot phase, and this commitment was confirmed at the Third Conference of the 
Parties in Kyoto in 1997 (the "Kyoto Protocol"). 
"Joint implementation" may be understood as the stage preliminary to a 
quantity-related policy with tradeable emission certificates: a country (a 
branch of industry, a firm, a community) can achieve its reduction 
commitments through a combination of national (internal) and international 
(external) reductions. Whereas this instrument was previously interpreted as 
meaning that an Annex-l party to the Climate Convention (i.e. industrial 
countries and countries in transformation) can meet its emission target under 
the treaty not only by means of quantitative reductions at home but also by 
investing in mitigation activities in another Annex-l country, the "Berlin 
Mandate" envisages 
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an enlargement according to which - on a voluntary basis - non-Annex-l states 
(i.e. developing countries) can also be involved in the procedure. This makes 
"joint implementation" a potentially important instrument in the North-South 
context. Joint implementation can thus be seen as a first step toward an 
international environmental policy aimed at controlling the quantities of 
emissions. How meaningful this instrument is or can be will, however, depends 
on a number of conditions still in need of clarification (see Jepma 1995). 
At the conference in Berlin in 1995, Germany reaffirmed its declared 
commitment, indeed even going a step further: "...to reduce, by the year 2005, 
its CO2 emissions by 25% as compared with 1990 levels" (speech of the 
German chancellor, April 5, 1995). Meanwhile, however, it has become evident 
that Germany will be unable to keep this pledge domestically. This problem 
could, however, easily be solved in the context of a joint implementation 
program involving eastern and southern Europe and the developing countries. 
It would thus make sense to fine-tune the instrument of "joint implementation," 
preferably in coordination with the members states of the European Union, 
particularly because in this way it would be possible to activate substantial 
private means for global climate protection. 
3.3     Internationally tradable emission certificates 
The current negotiations on the climate and biodiversity conventions must 
come up with binding global emission commitments. As far as the climate 
problematique is concerned, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPPC) is proceeding on the assumption that if the goal of the Climate 
Convention (Article 2) is to be achieved by the year 2050, global C02 
emissions will have to be reduced by roughly 50% with reference to 1987 
levels, which means reductions of 80% in the industrialized countries. An initial 
(albeit modest) stipulation of concrete goals of climate policy was reached at 
the Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto in 1997. The task now is to select 
the instruments best suited to reach the targets set - and thus best suited to 
giving shape to a system of internationally tradable emission certificates. 
A next step here would be to issue to the parties to the convention tradable 
certificates (licenses) equivalent to the total volume of permissible global 
emissions agreed upon on the basis of an allocation procedure yet to be 
arranged. If the initial allocation on this basis were insufficient to a participant's 
needs, this party (country, branch of industry, firm, a community) would have to 
acquire additional certificates in the market. For the participants in the system, 
this would mean a general incentive to lower emissions, i.e. either to minimize 
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the costs of purchasing additional certificates or to maximize the proceeds from 
the sale or lease of surplus certificates. If the initial allocation to developing 
countries leads to a surplus of certificates there (which is to be expected in 
view of their low per capita emissions), what emerges is a powerful mechanism 
for a net transfer of resources from North to South: The developing countries 
could sell or lease their surplus certificates to industrialized countries, for 
financial resources or for technologies. This would give rise to a market, where 
thus far none exists. 
The essential difference between a certificate system and an international 
tax or charge arrangement is that emission certificates would exactly hit the 
emission reduction mark. The financial costs would follow from the actual costs 
needed to reach this target. This contrasts with an emission tax that would 
regulate financial costs, but not the volume of emissions itself. A further 
difference would be that a tax arrangement would necessarily entail monetary 
transfers, whereas certificates could also be traded against nonmonetary 
gratuities (for instance, against patents). In general, a system of tradable 
emission certificates would widen the options for negotiations between North 
and South - and might, just for that reason, meet with widespread political 
approval. 
3.4      The next steps 
An agreement on the instruments of international environmental policy will have 
to satisfy several criteria, in particular those of equity, efficiency, and decision-
making under uncertainty. Depending on the way in which these criteria are 
weighted, the political recommendation will sway toward one or the other of 
these instruments, or toward a certain combination of them. 
In view of the constitution of the international political system and the 
structure and mode of operation of global environmental regimes, there is much 
that speaks in favor of market-based quantitative arrangements, in particular 
"joint implementation" in the initial phase and tradable emission certificates in 
the culminating phase of such a regime. This is, however, not to rule out 
regulative and tax-based arrangements, and not only because the 
implementation of these economic instruments also poses certain monitoring 
and verification problems. If, in particular, fund arrangements like the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) are to be further developed, this would require a 
certain measure of tax-based funding, because otherwise the autonomy of 
conventional multilateral development assistance would be negatively affected. 
This then would (re)direct our attention to other taxes and bases for 
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assessment that were proposed long ago, like for instance taxes on arms 
exports (Brandt Report 1983), long-distance tourism (Mishan 1970), 
international trade (Brundtland Report 1987), or international financial 
transactions (Quereshi / v. Weizsäcker Report 1995). 
4.       Institutionalization of international environmental policy. 
The future 
What is meant by institutions are permanent, interlinked rules and procedures 
that stipulate behavior, limit activities, and shape expectations 
(Haas/Keohane/Levy 1993, pp. 4-5.). They may take the form of bureaucratic 
organizations, general rule mechanisms (that do not necessarily have an 
organizational underpinning), or negotiated conventions. Institutions of inter-
national environmental policy mainly have, alone on account of the lack of 
hierarchical agencies of governance ("world government"), the form of 
horizontal self coordination on the level of nation states, and these institutions 
may operate both with instruments of direct regulation (type a) and by means of 
indirect regulation (type b) (more on this point below). 
A global view of the environmental problematique arose at the beginning of 
the 1970s. And thus it was that the first reports of the Club of Rome (in 
particular the study by Meadows et al.) were geared throughout to the "One 
World" model. "In Defense of Earth" was the title of a book published by Lynton 
K. Caldwell that, as early as 1972, called for a global institutionalization of 
environmental protection. For practical environmental policy, however, this 
initial global orientation of the scholarly discussion on the environment was of 
limited import. The period did, it is true, see the signing of a number of 
international environmental agreements, in particular on the protection of 
endangered species and the world's seas; the year 1973 also witnessed the 
inauguration of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and other 
international organizations presented environmental protection concepts of 
their own. Yet practical environmental protection continued to by marked 
largely by its restriction to national or border-related environmental problems 
(to wit: numerous OECD reports from the 1970s). 
It way only in the mid-1980s that a renewed internationalization began to 
take place. The striking signposts of this phase of environmental policy 
included the formulation of the "Montreal Protocol on the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer" (1987), the report of the World Commission on Environment and 
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Development • "Our Common Future" (1987), and the resumption of the 
discussion over the necessity of global climate protection. The first culminating 
point was the UN conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (the so-called Earth 
Summit), the course of which saw the signing of the framework conventions on 
climate and biodiversity, the Rio Declaration, the principles on forests, and 
AGENDA 21. 
Figure 14:     Steps on the way toward a global environmental policy 
-  UN Conference on Environment and Development, Stockholm 1972 
- Marpol agreements, 1973, 1978 (1983) 
(Prevention of pollution of the seas) 
- UN Law of the Seas Conference, 1973-1982 (1994) 
- Vienna  Convention  of  the Protection on the Ozone Layer, 1985, with 
Montreal Protocol, 1987 
and the subsequent tightening-up of its provisions: 
• London,  1990 
• Copenhagen,  1992 
-  UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 
1992 
with two global conventions: 
•  Climate Convention, 1992 (1994) 
•  Biodiversity Convention, 1992 (1993) 
as well as AGENDA 21 (1992) 
Source: Own compilation. 
As far as possible innovative approaches to environmental policy are 
concerned, the given framework conditions of international politics restrict any 
such approaches in a number of ways: in accordance with the fundamental 
principle of national sovereignty, environmental policy is, in the individual case, 
bound to the assent of representatives of nation states. The international 
decision-making process accordingly avails itself of the means of negotiations. 
Without the "shadow of hierarchy" (F.W. Scharpf) working in favor of decisions 
on national environmental policy, international environmental policy has to rely 
on voluntary consent for developing problem-related rules and mechanisms. 
For international environmental policy, therefore, the most important lever is to 
have or to gain influence on national processes of decision-making. On the 
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other hand, there is much evidence indicating that international agreements on 
certain standards can influence the strength of positions in national discussions 
on ecological interests. 
The interrelationships between individual problem areas also give rise to a 
particular need for functional coordination. Thus, for instance, the supply-
oriented policies of multilateral development banks in the energy or 
transportation sector tend to counteract the efforts of an effective, demand-
oriented climate policy. The need for coordination has increased also as a 
consequence of the sheer number of international environmental agreements. 
Various institutional innovations have been introduced in connection with the 
ongoing internationalization of environmental policy since the mid-1980s. They 
concern, on the one hand, in the sense of direct regulation, the setup of 
institutions for an organized transfer of funds and technology, and on the other 
hand, in the sense of indirect regulation, changes in the control of procedural, 
resource-related, and organizational matters. 
4.1      Transfer of financial resources and technology 
Various funds have been set up for the purpose of transferring financial 
resources and technology, intended to provide the developing countries with 
incentives to assume and fulfill international environmental commitments. 
Article 4, Paragraph 4 of the Montreal Protocol and Article 4, Paragraph 7 of 
the Climate Convention, for instance, link, in an explicit and legally binding 
manner, the environmental obligations of the developing countries to transfers 
on the part of the industrialized countries: if the latter fail to pay, the former are 
free of their obligations. 
These agreements at the same time stand for two different approaches to 
the transfers to be made. The Multilateral Ozone Fund set up in 1990 in 
connection with the Montreal Protocol is conceived only for transfers aimed at 
protecting the stratospheric ozone layer; it is thus an issue-specific form of the 
organization of compensation payments. The Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), likewise set up in 1990, and substantially reformed in 1994, is instead a 
central cross-sectoral institution responsible for transfer payments in the field of 
global environmental protection, particularly for measures to protect the ozone 
layer, climate, international waters, and biological diversity. 
Targeted economic incentives aimed at implementing environmental policy 
measures have not only been organized via such funds. Since the second half 
of the 1980s, "debt-for-nature swaps" have become increasingly important as a 
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means of funding environmental protection projects in developing countries. 
Since 1987 more than 20 such projects with an overall volume of far over 100 
million US-$ have been realized in this way (UN 1994, p. 21.). 
We here see at the same time the increasing importance and beneficial 
effects of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for international environ-
mental policy. It is in particular environmental groups and municipalities that 
play a major role in decision-making and implementation of measures (e.g. the 
Climate Alliance of numerous German towns and cities). In acknowledgment of 
this development neither the formulation nor the implementation of international 
environmental policy may be seen any longer as domains of purely 
intergovernmental policy. Accordingly, Chapters 27 and 38 of AGENDA 21 set 
the goal of involving environmental groups, industrial organizations, and 
municipalities in all phases of the formulation and implementation of policy. 
4.2     The control of processes, resources, and organization 
Moreover, a change in the traditional direct governance regulation in 
international environmental policy in underway. In view of the concept of 
sustainable development, new forms of indirect governance are being 
addressed. Capacity-building plays a central role here. What this means is 
above all the development of personnel capacities and administrative 
structures in the developing countries; in more general terms it means the 
expansion of a country's "personnel, scientific, technological, organizational, 
and financial potential" - which thus includes industrial countries as well. 
The processes of decision-making, balancing of interests, and 
implementation of action programs have also seen the advent of institutional 
innovations in recent years. In particular, a functional differentiation of 
communication  has taken place. Increasingly not only scientific issues but 
technical-economic and financial questions are deliberated in committees, 
separate from the actual political negotiation process, in this way relieving the 
process of political negotiation of some of its workload and clarifying the 
politically uncontroversial issues at a more rapid pace. 
As far as the processes of decision-making and implementation are 
concerned, one important innovation was the introduction of majority decisions 
binding on all parties. Within the Montreal Protocol, for instance, a decision was 
made to tighten up the control over the regulated substances: a decision taken 
with a two-thirds majority is directly binding on all parties without any need for 
national ratification. Within the GEF, a doubly weighted majority was 
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introduced: in this case a decision of the Executive Committee, which is made 
up equally of representatives from developing and industrial countries, can be 
reached with a 60% majority of the votes cast, providing that this majority also 
represents 60% of the funding contributions. This concedes a de facto veto 
position for both the main donor countries and the developing countries as a 
whole, while individual countries are unable to block collective decisions 
(WBGU 1994, pp. 25-26). 
Beyond this process of official international institution-building, the Rio 
follow-up process has seen the emergence of a number of other innovations in 
the nongovernmental sphere, for instance, the establishment of the Business 
Council for Sustainable Development made up of entrepreneurs committed to 
environmental protection, the foundation of the Planet Earth Council consisting 
of ecologically sensitive personalities, the European Business Council for a 
Sustainable Energy Future made up of representatives of firms that are 
committed to promoting renewable energy. 
Apart from these practical innovative successes, the current discussion has 
also witnessed various proposals for more thorough reforms, to be discussed in 
what follows. 
4.3     Fundamental institutional reorganization 
In the immediate follow-up to the 1992 UN conference in Rio de Janeiro 
proposals on a fundamental reorganization of the international institutional 
system were high on the agenda. One consideration advanced was to give the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) the status of a special 
organization,  or to amalgamate the environment program and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) to form such a special organization (UN 
1991). There was also a call to set up a Global Environment Council that would 
be endowed with a weight comparable to that wielded by the UN Security 
Council. 
A similar proposal concerned the establishment of a Global Environmental 
Organization (GEO) which - on the model of the GATT as the most important 
institution regulating world trade - would serve as a forum for formulating and 
implementing global environmental policy (Esty 1994); GEO would not only 
include the existing issue-specific international environmental agreements, it 
would also become the central institution concerned with financial and 
technology transfer aimed at supporting sustainable development in the 
developing world. 
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Sustainable development is per se an intergenerational undertaking. Against 
this background, the ongoing ecological discourse has developed or 
reactivated a number of concrete proposals: an "intergenerational ecological 
pact" (Brown-Weiss 1993), a "planetary legacy" and "common patrimony" 
(Brown-Weiss 1989), the "ecological rights of future generations" (Cousteau 
Society 1991), a "second chamber besides parliament" (von Hayek 1969), a 
"chamber of generations" (von Lersner 1994) are concepts, which, as unlike as 
they are, do share one common concern: that, in view of the present levels of 
resource consumption and environmental degradation, there is an urgent need 
for institutional arrangements to address and guarantee intergenerational 
equity. 
But there is still a pressing need for research and action to define and 
stipulate such rights and obligations toward future generations. The general 
political lesson that should be inferred would be to examine each and every 
policy in terms of whether or not it is in conformity with the principle of 
intergenerational equity. 
4.4      Changing institutions 
As far as the communication and decision-making processes at the inter-
national level are concerned, complaints are often heard that the predominant 
consensus procedure is unwieldy. By contrast, the positive effects of majority 
decisions of the type that recently became possible in the framework of the 
GEF have been referred to. The possibility of applying the model of the 
Montreal Protocol to other areas of global environmental policy has also been 
addressed. With an eye to facilitating and accelerating international decisions, 
emphasis should furthermore be given to the importance of consensus-
promoting argumentational processes ("policy dialogue"), permitting joint 
learning and a joint search on the part of the cooperation partners for solutions 
to common problems. 
One cross-sectoral dimension of institutional innovation - above and beyond 
the proposals outlined above - is the integration of the concept of sustainable 
development into the activities of all international organizations. One priority of 
the pertinent discussion is the call for an ecological reform of the GATT treaty 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). One issue - but by no means the 
only one - here is the danger that more strict environmental standards in one 
country could be counteracted by relocating "dirty" industries in countries with 
less stringent standards and then reimporting the products (so-called 
environmental dumping). The proposals for reforming the GATT (the WTO) 
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accordingly center on the inclusion of certain principles that facilitate the 
establishment of minimum ecological standards for products traded 
internationally (in detail, Helm 1995). 
Another problem associated with adequate consideration of global 
environmental issues concerns the way in which multilateral and bilateral 
development assistance operates. Project aid of multilateral development 
banks, for instance, can run counter to the goals of global environmental 
protection, thus hobbling the implementation of international environmental 
agreements. Environmental organizations have accordingly proposed that the 
executive organs of the climate, biodiversity, and desertification conventions 
should set targets governing the way that bilateral and multilateral development 
assistance organizations deploy their funds. 
A potentially important proposal for a change to the international institutional 
system was made by the Worldwatch Institute in its "State of the World Report 
1997": to replace the economically motivated Group of Seven, G7, with a 
Group of Eight, E8, founded on environmental and development-related 
principles - the "eight environmental heavyweights." These would be four 
industrialized countries and four developing countries which together account 
for 56 percent of the world population, generate 59 percent of world production, 
and possess 53 percent of the world's forested areas. 
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- 
Based on a total of 250 000 known species. Due to an overlapping of species in 
individual countries is was not possible to calculate the total percentage. 
Source: WorldWatch Institute Report 1997, p. 8. 
The E8 group - it is to be expected - would have far more influence in 
shaping the future of our planet than the G7 countries do now. Though the 
political systems of the eight states are highly different, as far as their influence 
on the stocks of global resources and global environmental damage is 
concerned, they are singular - eight environmental heavyweights, so to speak. 
It is, noted Worldwatch, time for the E8 to take on more responsibility for the 
enforcement of existing environmental agreements and the formulation of new 
ones, for them to become the catalyst of action: "A key challenge will be to 
focus on the common interests of all countries rather than on national interests; 
in the struggle for a sustainable world, the fates of rich and poor, of North and 
South are inextricably linked." (Worldwatch Institute Report 1997, p. 10) 
4.5     Enlarging institutions 
It has been suggested that the experience gained in the International Labor 
Organization's (ILO) audit of the performance of national behavior (i.e. social 
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standards) might be applied to environmental issues (i.e. environmental 
standards). In recent years, the practice of issuing ecological audits, borrowed 
from the field of business management, has caught on in Germany and many 
other countries at a surprisingly rapid pace. 
The European Union's Regulation (EEC) No. 1836/93 of June 29, 1993, 
(eco-audit or EMAS regulation) created a single framework for company-level 
environmental management and the evaluation of environmentally relevant 
performance and impacts. It would be possible to ground an audit of 
environmental policy, programs, and management on principles similar to those 
used for company audits. A preliminary phase of this proposal can be seen in 
the reports of the OECD on the environmental policies of its members, which 
have, since the beginning of the 1990s, been prepared in keeping with a 
uniform framework (e.g. OECD, Germany, 1993). The transparency of actor 
behavior could in this way be addressed at the international level as well. Since 
there is no legitimated policy agency at this level equipped to enforce 
compliance with obligations, the task would be to ensure that noncompliant 
behavior is perceived by a broad international public. 
The proposal to set up an international environmental court involves 
enlarging the existing institutional system in another way. An international court 
could serve to improve the manner in which conflicts over environmental issues 
are settled; at the same time, this would mean creating an additional instrument 
to sanction those who damage the environment. Unlike the ecological audit, 
which operates on incentives to stimulate environmentally friendly behavior, the 
effects anticipated here would stem from intensifying the disincentives against 
environmentally harmful behavior. 
In addition to the above-outlined proposals additional possibilities exist to 
render international negotiations on environmental issues more flexible: 
•  The growing economic-ecological interdependencies   make compensation- 
or package-based solutions possible.  As  in the case of the "debt-for- 
sustainable-development swaps" approaches might then be realized within 
a larger frame of reference. 
•  The ongoing differentiation of environment-related discourses make the 
negotiation processes more flexible, since distributional conflicts would lose 
some of their significance. It is thus precisely in and through international 
negotiations that expert publics will emerge. 
•  Large-scale conferences aimed at initiating long-term negotiations can make 
sense if they are used to shape public opinion in a level-headed, integrative 
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fashion. This leads to a conception of international negotiation processes 
with major conferences and continuous detailed negotiations - a conception 
that is already being pursued in the case of ozone, climate, and biodiversity 
policies. 
4.5      Outlook 
The continuing institutionalization of international environmental policy is 
revitalizing ideas and concepts that were under discussion in the German-
speaking countries at an earlier point of time, even though the discussion then 
may have been conducted with a different terminology. The global governance 
discussion can, for instance, profit from the concept of Ordnungspolitik. Other 
central ideas, such as participation, intergenerational pact, trusteeship, are 
likewise potentially powerful. Here we can learn certain lessons that should be 
adhered to in the further development of international environmental policy. 
Independently of whether or not the task of (re)activating such ideas and 
concepts meets with success, we have to bear in mind some important national 
presuppositions  of an  effective  international environmental policy.   These 
include above all: 
•  a heightened political awareness of global environmental problems and the 
conditions under which they emerge; 
•  sufficient (which is to say: greater) capacities for analyzing and processing 
global environmental problems and the pre-conditions required to solve 
them; 
•  an increase in the competence and commitment of national representatives 
on international panels with direct and indirect environmental relevance (like 
UNEP, GEF, WTO, etc.). 
But the credibility of national reform initiatives, in the sense of consistency 
between the approaches toward innovative international environmental policy 
with the national level projects, could prove to be of even greater significance. 
The important thing is not only the compatibility of environmental initiatives with 
other activities involved in foreign policy, for instance the necessary ecological 
reform of the GATT/WTO regime; new instruments of environmental policy -
such as environmental taxes, "joint implementation," and emission certificates -
could be convincingly propagated at the international level only if national 
environmental policy is adjusted accordingly. And as far as AGENDA 21 is 
concerned, the mobilization of many local AGENDA initiatives is a sine qua non 
for the success of this new approach to policy. On many of these issues, it 
seems, there continues to be a need for further scientific clarification and 
political action. 
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